Comparison Overview
Jason's Deli
Jason's Deli
Beaumont, TX, US, 77701
Last Update: 24/03/2026
As an independent, family-owned business, Jason’s Deli has the freedom to do the right thing, every day. So, we say no to shortcuts, and yes to the way of serving customers and communities we’ve known for more than 40 years. It’s a family thing.
Whataburger
300 Concord Plaza Dr, San Antonio, 78216, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
On Aug. 8, 1950, an adventurous and determined entrepreneur named Harmon Dobson opened up the world’s first Whataburger on Ayers Street in Corpus Christi, Texas. He had a simple goal: to serve a burger so big it took two hands to hold and so good that after one bite cus...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Jason's Deli
Whataburger
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Restaurants Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Jason's Deli in 2026.
Incidents vs Restaurants Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Whataburger in 2026.
Incident History - Jason's Deli (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Jason's Deli cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Whataburger (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Whataburger cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Jason's Deli
Whataburger
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.