Comparison Overview
Jack Wills

Jack Wills
N/A
Last Update: 31/03/2026
Established in 1999, as a single shop in the seaside town of Salcombe, Jack Wills has since expanded to become an international brand with 60 stores worldwide. Working with people who push the boundaries, we create clothing and accessories for those who appreciate effo...

Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Ltd.
Piramal Agastya Corporate Park, Building 'A', 4th and 5th Floor, Unit No. 401, 403, 501, 502, L.B.S. Road, Kurla, Mumbai, Maharashtra, IN, 400070
Last Update: 31/03/2026
Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Limited (ABFRL), part of the Aditya Birla Group, is India’s leading fashion powerhouse, offering a distinguished portfolio of renowned brands and retail formats, catering to multiple high-growth segments. As of March 31, 2025, the Compan...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Jack Wills







Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Ltd.






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Apparel and Fashion Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Jack Wills in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Apparel and Fashion Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Ltd. in 2026.
Incident History - Jack Wills (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Jack Wills cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Ltd. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Ltd. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Jack Wills

Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Ltd.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Fides is an open-source privacy engineering platform. From version 2.33.0 to before version 2.84.5, there is a DOM-based XSS vulnerability in fides.js via the fides_description override. This issue has been patched in version 2.84.5.
WACRM prior to commit 73041bf contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the automation engine that allows authenticated attackers to access and modify contacts belonging to other tenants by supplying an arbitrary caller-controlled contact_id in the POST request body without tenant ownership verification. Attackers can exploit the service-role client that bypasses row-level security to modify victim contact fields including name, email, and company across tenant boundaries using only a known contact UUID.
Namespace attributes are not encoded correctly during HTML serialization. This allows bypassing the cross-site scripting prevention mechanism of typo3/html-sanitizer before version 2.3.2.
When ALLOW_INSECURE_RAW_TEXT is enabled, whitespace-variant closing tags (e.g., </style\t>) are not recognized by the sanitizer but accepted by browsers as valid end tags, allowing subsequent content to escape sanitization. This allows bypassing the cross-site scripting prevention mechanism of typo3/html-sanitizer before version 2.3.2.
Headplane is a feature-complete Web UI for Headscale. Prior to versions 0.6.3 and 0.7.0-beta.3, Headplane was vulnerable to a path traversal / authorization bypass in the Headscale API client used by node and user rename operations. This issue has been patched in versions 0.6.3 and 0.7.0-beta.3.