Comparison Overview
Jack Henry
Jack Henry
663 W. Highway 60, P.O. Box 807, Monett, Missouri, US, 65708
Last Update: 01/09/2026
Jack Henry (Nasdaq: JKHY) is a well-rounded financial technology company that strengthens the connections between people and their financial institutions through technology and services that reduce the barriers to financial health. Approximately 7,500 community and regi...
Discover
2500 Lake Cook Road, Riverwoods, IL, US, 60015
Last Update: 16/09/2026
Discover® is now part of Capital One. Together, we’ll continue to deliver exceptional financial products and experiences, drive innovation, and serve customers. Find the latest updates at https://capitalonediscover.com. Discover is one of the most recognized brands in ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Jack Henry
Discover
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Jack Henry in 2026.
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Discover in 2026.
Incident History - Jack Henry (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Jack Henry cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Discover (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Discover cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Jack Henry
Discover
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
vLLM through 0.29.0 fails to properly clean up decode-side metadata for rejected inference requests in prefill/decode disaggregated deployments. Remote attackers can submit requests with max_tokens=0 to exhaust decode-worker memory without bound until the worker restarts.
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/v0.29.0/vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/nixl/push_worker.py#L162-L181
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/55677
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vllm-through-0.29.0-memory-exhaustion-via-rejected-requests
redis-parser through 3.0.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the RESP protocol parser that allows malicious Redis endpoints to crash the client process through unbounded recursion on nested arrays. Attackers can send crafted RESP byte streams with repeated array headers that exhaust the V8 call stack, causing an uncaught RangeError that terminates the Node.js process without triggering error handling callbacks.
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser/blob/701655430f5f7d9ca00892a02f7eefcbc1193a98/lib/parser.js#L204-L213
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser/blob/701655430f5f7d9ca00892a02f7eefcbc1193a98/lib/parser.js#L291-L306
- https://github.com/redis/ioredis/issues/2108
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/redis-parser-through-3.0.0-denial-of-service-via-unbounded-recursion
Improper neutralization of special elements in output used by a downstream component ('injection') in Azure Cosmos DB allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Azure AI Foundry allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Missing authentication for critical function in Azure AI Foundry allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.