Comparison Overview
J & P Richardson Contracting

J & P Richardson Contracting
114 Campbell Avenue, WACOL, 4076, AU
Last Update: 11/03/2026
J & P RICHARDSON INDUSTRIES J & P Richardson Industries (JPR) is one of Australia’s longest established Electrical Contracting and Engineering firms, offering 60 years local experience and proven project delivery. This, combined with parent company Vinci Energies’ leadi...

Foxconn
US
Last Update: 23/09/2026
Established in Taiwan in 1974, Hon Hai Technology Group (Foxconn) (2317: Taiwan) is the world’s largest electronics manufacturer. Foxconn is also the leading technological solution provider, and it continuously leverages its expertise in software and hardware to integra...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

J & P Richardson Contracting







Foxconn






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for J & P Richardson Contracting in 2026.
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
Foxconn has 292.16% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - J & P Richardson Contracting (X = Date, Y = Severity)
J & P Richardson Contracting cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Foxconn (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Foxconn cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

J & P Richardson Contracting

Foxconn
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.