Comparison Overview
IOM Mongolia

IOM Mongolia
United Nations Street 14, Sukhbaatar District, Ulaanbaatar, 14201, MN
Last Update: 23/12/2025
International Organization for Migration in Mongolia Олон улсын шилжилт хөдөлгөөний байгууллага

World Health Organization
20, avenue Appia, Geneva 27, 1211, CH
Last Update: 02/04/2026
The World Health Organization's mission: to promote health, keep the world safe, and serve the vulnerable. Working through offices in more than 150 countries, WHO staff work side by side with governments and other partners to ensure the highest attainable level of healt...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

IOM Mongolia







World Health Organization






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs International Affairs Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for IOM Mongolia in 2026.
Incidents vs International Affairs Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for World Health Organization in 2026.
Incident History - IOM Mongolia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
IOM Mongolia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - World Health Organization (X = Date, Y = Severity)
World Health Organization cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

IOM Mongolia

World Health Organization
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.