Comparison Overview
INTRASOFT International

INTRASOFT International
2b rue Nicolas Bové, Luxembourg, undefined, L-1253, LU
Last Update: 08/02/2026
Please, make sure you follow our new page - https://www.linkedin.com/company/netcompany-intrasoft-sa INTRASOFT International is a leading European IT Solutions and Services Group with strong international presence and expertise, offering innovative and added-value sol...

Dimension Data
The Campus, 57 Sloane Street Cnr Sloane Street and Main Road, Bryanston, Johannesburg, ZA, 2021
Last Update: 24/09/2026
Dimension Data is a leading African born technology provider operating in the Middle East and Africa, offering a portfolio of services including systems integration, managed services infrastructure, cloud solutions, business applications, customer experience, and intell...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

INTRASOFT International







Dimension Data






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for INTRASOFT International in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Dimension Data in 2026.
Incident History - INTRASOFT International (X = Date, Y = Severity)
INTRASOFT International cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Dimension Data (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Dimension Data cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

INTRASOFT International

Dimension Data
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security flaw has been discovered in THU-MIG yoloe up to 40cd606cabdbe2b566d6f14a6b162c89206e9a1b. This affects the function eval of the file ultralytics/nn/autobackend.py of the component AutoBackend Model Loading. The manipulation of the argument imgsz/names/kpt_shape results in improper neutralization of directives in dynamically evaluated code. The attack requires a local approach. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. This product does not use versioning. This is why information about affected and unaffected releases are unavailable. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Coder before 2.34.7 contains an IP spoofing vulnerability in the ExtractRealIPAddress middleware that trusts the leftmost, client-supplied X-Forwarded-For value instead of the client IP appended by a reverse proxy. Attackers can send forged X-Forwarded-For values through appending proxies to bypass per-IP rate limits on login, one-time passcode, and password validation endpoints, enabling brute-force attacks, and to falsify IP addresses recorded in audit logs.
Coder before 2.29.17, 2.30.0 before 2.32.7, 2.33.0 before 2.33.8, and 2.34.0 before 2.34.2 contains a user enumeration vulnerability because userpassword.Compare() substitutes a placeholder hash derived from the string "hunter2" when a stored password hash is empty. Unauthenticated attackers can submit logins with the password "hunter2" and distinguish HTTP 403 from 401 responses to enumerate valid accounts and reveal the authentication provider of SSO-only users.
Coder before 2.29.17, 2.30.0 before 2.32.7, 2.33.0 before 2.33.8, and 2.34.0 before 2.34.2 contains a stored HTML injection vulnerability because the ApplicationName and LogoURL appearance settings are rendered into HTML output without sufficient escaping. Attackers with the Owner role can store HTML markup in these settings that renders in the Coder dashboard and in SMTP notification emails sent to other deployment users.
Coder from 2.0.0 before 2.34.8 contains an open redirect vulnerability in handleAPIKeySmuggling that allows attackers to redirect users externally via unsanitized r.URL.Path values. Attackers can craft links on trusted workspace app subdomains with paths beginning with double slashes, which become scheme-relative redirects to attacker sites for phishing.