Comparison Overview
Intertek Brazil

Intertek Brazil
Alameda Mamoré, Barueri, São Paulo, 06454-040, BR
Last Update: 16/01/2026
For more than 130 years, companies around the world have depended on Intertek to help ensure the quality and safety of their products, processes and systems. We go beyond testing, inspecting and certifying products; we are a Total Quality Assurance provider to industri...

ALS
25 King St, Bowen Hills, Queensland, AU, 4006
Last Update: 03/04/2026
A global leader in testing, ALS provides comprehensive testing solutions to clients in a wide range of industries around the world. Using state-of-the-art technologies and innovative methodologies, our dedicated international teams deliver highest-quality testing servic...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Intertek Brazil







ALS






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs International Trade and Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Intertek Brazil in 2026.
Incidents vs International Trade and Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ALS in 2026.
Incident History - Intertek Brazil (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Intertek Brazil cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - ALS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ALS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Intertek Brazil

ALS
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security vulnerability has been detected in Tenda CP3 27.5.57.101. Impacted is an unknown function of the file custom-x/softap/hostapd. Such manipulation of the argument wpa_passphrase leads to hard-coded credentials. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used.
A weakness has been identified in Tenda CP3 27.5.57.101. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file Net/NetCheckPing.cpp. This manipulation of the argument interface_name/host causes os command injection. The attack can be initiated remotely.
A security flaw has been discovered in Tenda CP3 27.5.57.101. This vulnerability affects the function SystemAsh of the file Apis/system.c of the component Kylin. The manipulation of the argument AlarmVoiceURL results in os command injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely.
A vulnerability in the N-central internal API access control filter allows unauthorised access to internal APIs. This is fixed in N-central 2026.3 HF3 and 2026.4
RouterOS contains an argument-handling flaw in the SSH login path involving usernames that begin with a prohibited character, allowing for the trusted RouterOS policy mask to be changed, leading to privilege escalation. Exploitation requires an unauthenticated SSH session to reach the RouterOS login helper.This issue was fixed in versions: 6.49.21 (Long-term), 7.23.4 (Long-term) and 7.24.2 (Stable)
- https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/09/mikrotik-routeros-cve
- https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/09/vulnerabilities-in-mikrotik-routeros-actively-exploited/
- https://forum.mikrotik.com/t/6-49-21-long-term-is-released/272802
- https://forum.mikrotik.com/t/7-23-4-long-term-is-released/272801
- https://forum.mikrotik.com/t/7-24-2-stable-is-released/272800
- https://mikrotik.com/supportsec/september-2026-vulnerability/
- https://npratley.net/reversing-mikrotiks-silent-patch-the-routeros-7-23-4-fix-they-wouldnt-explain/