Comparison Overview
Internet Initiative Japan (IIJ)

Internet Initiative Japan (IIJ)
2-10-2 Fujimi, Chiyoda-ku,, Tokyo, 1020071, JP
Last Update: 10/09/2026
Ever since its establishment in 1992 as the first Japanese Internet Service Provider, IIJ has been taking pioneering steps in the field of Internet technology. By leveraging the technological expertise gained through providing Internet connectivity services, the company...

Mphasis
Mphasis Limited, Bagmane Laurel, 1st Floor, Tower A, , Bagmane Technology Park, C V Raman Nagar, Bangalore, Karnataka, IN, 560093
Last Update: 15/09/2026
A leading applied technology services company, we innovate to deliver service excellence and successful outcomes across sales, delivery and development. With our strategy to be agile, nimble and customer-centric, we anticipate the future of applied technology and predic...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Internet Initiative Japan (IIJ)







Mphasis






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
Internet Initiative Japan (IIJ) has 32.43% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Mphasis in 2026.
Incident History - Internet Initiative Japan (IIJ) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Internet Initiative Japan (IIJ) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Mphasis (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Mphasis cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Internet Initiative Japan (IIJ)

Mphasis
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.