Comparison Overview
ITP - Integrated Transport Planning

ITP - Integrated Transport Planning
1 Broadway, Nottingham, NG1 1PR, GB
Last Update: 21/01/2026
ITP is a UK-based sustainable transport planning consultancy supporting clients to plan and implement innovative solutions to complex transport challenges. We’re part of the Haskoning family, an independent international engineering and project management consultancy. I...

Arcadis
Gustav Mahlerplein 97-103, Amsterdam, Nederland, NL, 1082 MS
Last Update: 30/03/2026
Arcadis is a leading global partner, delivering transformative projects with businesses, cities and industries. With 36,000 people active in more than 30 countries, we bring together the best minds from around the world to deliver intelligent products and solutions that...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ITP - Integrated Transport Planning







Arcadis






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Professional Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ITP - Integrated Transport Planning in 2026.
Incidents vs Professional Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Arcadis in 2026.
Incident History - ITP - Integrated Transport Planning (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ITP - Integrated Transport Planning cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Arcadis (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Arcadis cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ITP - Integrated Transport Planning

Arcadis
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.