Comparison Overview
Securitas Integrated Guarding
Securitas Integrated Guarding
9 Campus Drive, Parsippany, 07054, US
Last Update: 05/01/2026
Three-dimensional approach to security that provides an efficient, cost-effective security solution. Securitas’ core business focuses on delivering integrated security solutions. In close cooperation with clients, we develop customized and efficient solutions with the ...
Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.
9 Campus Drive, Parsippany, 07054, US
Last Update: 03/04/2026
Securitas knows Security. It is our only business. As The Leader in Protective Services, we invest in people, knowledge and technology to deliver customized, cost-effective and class-leading solutions. Our parent company, Securitas AB, is a global company headquartered ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Securitas Integrated Guarding
Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Security and Investigations Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Securitas Integrated Guarding in 2026.
Incidents vs Security and Investigations Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. in 2026.
Incident History - Securitas Integrated Guarding (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Securitas Integrated Guarding cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Securitas Integrated Guarding
Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.