Comparison Overview
ING Hubs Poland

ING Hubs Poland
ul. Zabrska 19, Katowice, undefined, 40-083, PL
Last Update: 19/03/2026
We’re one of ING's global competence centres. We improve global banking by designing and delivering technological and operational solutions, with end-to-end expertise. Our offices are located in Katowice and Warsaw. For over 20 years we’ve been taking up challenges and...

Akbank
4. Levent Besiktas, Istanbul, 34330, TR
Last Update: 05/04/2026
Akbank was founded as a local bank in Adana in January 1948. Established originally with the core objective to provide funding to local cotton producers, the Bank opened its first branch in the Sirkeci district of Istanbul on July 14, 1950. In 1954, after relocating its...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ING Hubs Poland







Akbank






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ING Hubs Poland in 2026.
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Akbank in 2026.
Incident History - ING Hubs Poland (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ING Hubs Poland cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Akbank (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Akbank cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ING Hubs Poland

Akbank
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. In versions 0.5.6 through 0.7.2, when a `ClientPasswordReset` record already exists for a client (from a previous unexpired reset request), subsequent calls to the `reset_password` guest API endpoint reuse the existing token instead of generating a new one. The 15-minute validity window is anchored to the first request's `created_at` timestamp, not the time of the most recent email. An attacker who obtained the original reset link remains able to use it even after the victim requests a new reset, because the original token is never invalidated or rotated. Version 0.8.0 patches the issue. Some workarounds are available. Configure a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, Apache, Cloudflare) to apply per-IP rate limiting to the `/client/reset-password` endpoint to minimize the window of opportunity, and/or manually clear expired `client_password_reset` records from the database after a client reports a suspected compromise.
FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. Versions prior to 0.8.0 allow a low-privileged staff account to grant arbitrary module permissions to itself through the admin API, resulting in persistent privilege escalation. A staff user that only has `staff.create_and_edit_staff` can call `/api/admin/staff/permissions_update` targeting their own account and write any permission structure, bypassing the intended role-based access control boundary. Version 0.8.0 patches the issue. Some workarounds are available. Restrict the `staff.create_and_edit_staff` permission to only highly trusted staff members and/or use a reverse proxy or WAF to restrict access to `/api/admin/staff/permissions_update` to specific trusted roles.
FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. Versions 0.5.3 through 0.7.2 allow authenticated clients to both read and reset API key service secrets for orders that are no longer in an `active` state (e.g., `suspended`, `canceled`). The root cause is missing order-state validation in two client API endpoints, despite an `isActive()` helper already existing in the `Serviceapikey` module and the frontend UI correctly gating access on `order.status == 'active'`. Version 0.8.0 contains a fix. Some workarounds are available. If the `Serviceapikey` module is not needed, uninstall it to remove the affected endpoints. One may also use a reverse proxy or WAF to restrict access to `/api/client/order/service` and `/api/client/serviceapikey/reset` based on application-level order-state logic.
FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. Versions prior to 0.8.0 allow low-privileged staff accounts to perform unauthorized actions via admin API endpoints. The root cause is a combination of the `can_always_access` module flag (which grants all staff access to certain modules) and insufficient permission checks or unsafe parameter handling on individual endpoints. Version 0.8.0 contains a fix. Some workarounds are available. Restrict staff accounts to only those who need access to sensitive settings and/or use a reverse proxy or WAF to restrict access to the affected endpoints to trusted IP addresses or higher-privilege roles.
FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. In versions 0.5.6 through 0.7.2, when the "Require Email Confirmation" setting is enabled, a logged-in client with an unverified email address (`email_approved = 0`) can access all client-area pages (e.g. `/client/balance`, `/client/order/list`, `/client/invoice`) and read real account data, including wallet balances and transaction history. The API-side enforcement correctly restricts unverified clients to only profile-related endpoints, but the page-side enforcement is overly permissive, allowing any request whose path starts with `/client`. Version 0.8.0 contains a fix. No known workarounds that don't involve modifying the source code are available.