Comparison Overview
Incruit

Incruit
Jungnim-ro 49 5F, Junggu, 04507, KR
Last Update: 20/04/2026
Incruit, established in 1998, is a pioneering HR tech company in South Korea, dedicated to connecting people and jobs to create a happier world. As the first online recruitment platform in the country, we revolutionized the job market by shifting the recruitment process...

Nothing
John Street, London, GB
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Nothing exists to make tech feel exciting again. We’re building a different kind of company, one that puts design, emotion, and human creativity at the heart of everything we do. From the way our products look to how they sound, feel, and function, we care about the de...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Incruit







Nothing






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Incruit in 2026.
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
Nothing has 5.66% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Incruit (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Incruit cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Nothing (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Nothing cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Incruit

Nothing
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Cline is an autonomous coding agent as an SDK, IDE extension, or CLI assistant. Prior to 3.0.30, the Cline Hub dashboard server launched by the cline dashboard command accepts WebSocket connections on the /browser endpoint without validating the Origin header, and when ROOM_SECRET is unset for local 127.0.0.1 binds, isAuthorizedBrowserRequest() allows attacker-controlled websites to send desktopCommand frames that read workspace state, mutate MCP and provider settings, and trigger command execution when a provider or model is configured. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.30.
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. In version 1.9.0, CoreWCF SPNEGO SecurityContextToken negotiation can expose the proof key recovered from the RSTR when TransportWithMessageCredential with Windows client credentials and session establishment are used, allowing an observer to impersonate the authenticated Windows principal and decrypt or forge WS-SecureConversation traffic. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.1.
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF WS-Security endorsing and supporting signature verification does not ensure the selected ds:Signature covers the expected Security header target, allowing an attacker with one captured signed SOAP envelope to replay arbitrary service operations as the victim principal. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0589692d4b9a41d21b34ac48281e95f6df7f4ce5
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/30aef805270976c42477e3f2a05f4e563d86e247
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/4618f24165ad018ad3ed2636bf8c3bc87d2a3be2
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-gqv6-pwcg-87r8
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF SAML 1.1 and SAML 2.0 token validation does not correctly resolve the issuer signing key or require signed tokens when IdentityConfiguration is used with federated bindings, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to impersonate any principal the trusted STS could issue. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0b8c8af851260e85e8402af53233d1b8f87dfb6f
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0e63c2cca55763d8be6b226a234579280a09e7b6
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/e5cc9b6a4ecc102a50d782093bfc72e0790abe3d
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-xjr9-gg9q-jx3v
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF SAML token validation does not enforce SubjectConfirmation method URIs or holder-of-key proof keys in SamlSecurityTokenHandler, allowing holder-of-key downgrade or custom confirmation method assertions to authenticate a subject without proving authority over the assertion. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/6a99df3242f54acd6f89edfd6050430b72d0c685
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/86dd3232b6b8aaf32281be9e8d798afad6145d58
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/9eb9b46d1c2af06fb71f656a02f4d5b4649c1f03
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-48pq-2xq3-c2m4