Comparison Overview
IMechE UAS Challenge

IMechE UAS Challenge
Institution of Mechanical Engineers, London, SW1H 9JJ, GB
Last Update: 11/03/2026
Launched in 2014 with the key objectives of developing professional engineers and inspiring the next generation, the UAS Challenge is an annual student engineering competition run by the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, with teams of undergraduates participating fro...

Black & Veatch
11401 Lamar Avenue, Overland Park, KS, US, 66211
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Black & Veatch is an employee-owned, global leader in building critical human infrastructure in Energy, Water, Digital Connectivity and Government Services. Since 1915, we have helped our clients improve business operations and the lives of people in over 100 countries ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

IMechE UAS Challenge







Black & Veatch






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Engineering Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for IMechE UAS Challenge in 2026.
Incidents vs Engineering Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Black & Veatch in 2026.
Incident History - IMechE UAS Challenge (X = Date, Y = Severity)
IMechE UAS Challenge cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Black & Veatch (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Black & Veatch cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

IMechE UAS Challenge

Black & Veatch
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.