Comparison Overview
IMechE Design Challenge
IMechE Design Challenge
N/A
Last Update: 14/08/2026
UGL
Level 8, 40 Miller Street, North Sydney, NSW, AU, 2060
Last Update: 14/09/2026
UGL is CIMIC Group's specialist end-to-end engineering, services and operations provider. We have a rich history dating back to 1899 and since then we have grown to be a market leader in many of the sectors in which we operate. Working with some of the most important c...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
IMechE Design Challenge
UGL
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Engineering Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for IMechE Design Challenge in 2026.
Incidents vs Engineering Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for UGL in 2026.
Incident History - IMechE Design Challenge (X = Date, Y = Severity)
IMechE Design Challenge cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - UGL (X = Date, Y = Severity)
UGL cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
IMechE Design Challenge
UGL
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to exposure of session tokens in the HTML response.
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an XML external entity (XXE) injection flaw.
IBM Aspera Enterprise WebApps 1.0.0 through 1.0.6 could allow a local attacker to obtain sensitive information due to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.
IBM Planning Analytics 2.0, and 2.1 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a stack-based buffer overflow.
IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 can allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to present a forged TLS certificate, intercept the connection, and capture the IAM bearer Authorization header automatically attached by the session adapter. The captured token grants full platform-scope tenant API access, enabling the attacker to read and manipulate the victim's DataStage projects, flows, assets, and pipeline definitions. This is client-side SDK code running on the user's own machine, so exploitation requires an external network interceptor rather than a co-tenant in the shared cluster.