Comparison Overview
Ikano Group

Ikano Group
1, rue Nicolas Welter, Luxembourg, 2740, LU
Last Update: 19/03/2026
At Ikano, our vision is to create possibilities for better living. We are an international group of companies with around 8,000 co-workers in 11 countries, active within real estate, production, insurance, data analytics and retail. Ikano Group was established in 1988 a...

Burlington Stores, Inc.
2006 Route 130, Burlington, NJ, US, 08016
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Burlington Stores, Inc., headquartered in New Jersey, is a nationally recognized off-price retailer. Burlington is a Fortune 500 company and its common stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol “BURL.” The Company operates more than 1000 sto...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Ikano Group







Burlington Stores, Inc.






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Ikano Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Burlington Stores, Inc. in 2026.
Incident History - Ikano Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ikano Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Burlington Stores, Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Burlington Stores, Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Ikano Group

Burlington Stores, Inc.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.