Comparison Overview
Identity Theft Resource Center
Identity Theft Resource Center
San Diego, 92123, US
Last Update: 11/09/2026
Established in 1999, the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) is the only national non-profit in the U.S. to provide live, direct identity crime advice and victim assistance at no-cost. Our vision is a "world where nobody can use my identity but me." Our mission is to...
Rentokil Terminix
N/A
Last Update: 01/04/2026
The Rentokil and Terminix family of brands have come together to form the world’s leading pest control company. With our shared vision, we’ll be expanding our products, services, and technology. And with our combined resources, we’ll do more to power innovation and deve...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Identity Theft Resource Center
Rentokil Terminix
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Consumer Services Industry Avg (This Year)
Identity Theft Resource Center has 313.22% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Consumer Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Rentokil Terminix in 2026.
Incident History - Identity Theft Resource Center (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Identity Theft Resource Center cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Rentokil Terminix (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Rentokil Terminix cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Identity Theft Resource Center
Rentokil Terminix
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.