Comparison Overview
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China

Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
No.55 FuXingMenNei Street, Xicheng District, Beijing, P.R.C, Beijing, 100140, CN
Last Update: 05/09/2026
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. (ICBC) (simplified Chinese: 中国工商银行; traditional Chinese: 中國工商銀行; pinyin: Zhōngguó Gōngshāng Yínháng, more commonly just 工行 Gōngháng) is China's largest bank and the largest bank in the world. It is one of China's "Big Four" s...

Citizens
1 Citizens Plaza, Providence, 02903, US
Last Update: 08/09/2026
At Citizens, we recognize that the journey to accomplishment is no longer linear and that individuals are made of all they have done and all they are going to do. As one of the oldest and largest financial services firms in the United States with a history dating back t...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Industrial and Commercial Bank of China







Citizens






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in 2026.
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
Citizens has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Citizens (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Citizens cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Industrial and Commercial Bank of China

Citizens
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.