Comparison Overview
IAG Cargo

IAG Cargo
Sealand Road, London, TW6 3AQ, GB
Last Update: 08/03/2026
Five airlines. One Cargo Carrier. We are in the business of moving things. From antibiotics to rhinoceros, gold bullion to avocados. Whatever people need, wherever they are. In an era of digital screens and closed borders, we open the skies and fly the world to bring pe...

DSV - Global Transport and Logistics
Hovedgaden 630, Hedehusene, DK, 2640
Last Update: 13/09/2026
At DSV, we keep supply chains flowing in a world of change. We provide and manage supply chain solutions for thousands of companies every day – from small family-run businesses to large global corporations. Our reach is global, yet our presence is local and close to our...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

IAG Cargo







DSV - Global Transport and Logistics






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for IAG Cargo in 2026.
Incidents vs Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for DSV - Global Transport and Logistics in 2026.
Incident History - IAG Cargo (X = Date, Y = Severity)
IAG Cargo cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - DSV - Global Transport and Logistics (X = Date, Y = Severity)
DSV - Global Transport and Logistics cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

IAG Cargo

DSV - Global Transport and Logistics
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.