Comparison Overview
Hyve Solutions

Hyve Solutions
44131 Nobel Drive, Fremont, CA, 94538, US
Last Update: 26/02/2026
Hyve Solutions is a leader in the design to worldwide deployment of hyperscale digital infrastructures. In partnership with customers, Hyve leverages deep-seated industry experience and strong vendor partnerships to design and deliver purpose-built server, storage, and ...

Seagate Technology
47488 Kato Rd, Fremont, CA, US, 94538
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Seagate is a leader in mass-capacity data storage. We’ve delivered more than four and a half billion terabytes of capacity over the past four decades. We make storage that scales, bringing trust and integrity to innovations that depend on data. In an era of unprecedente...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Hyve Solutions







Seagate Technology






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Computer Hardware Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Hyve Solutions in 2026.
Incidents vs Computer Hardware Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Seagate Technology in 2026.
Incident History - Hyve Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Hyve Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Seagate Technology (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Seagate Technology cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Hyve Solutions

Seagate Technology
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.