Comparison Overview
HYDAC Australia & New Zealand

HYDAC Australia & New Zealand
109 - 111 Dohertys Road, Altona North, 3025, AU
Last Update: 28/01/2026
HYDAC International is a world leader in motion control and fluid technology, operating in over 50 countries with over 10,000 employees and 500 sales and service partners worldwide. HYDAC offers an extensive product range to cover all areas of fluid power. The company ...

Johnson Controls
Milwaukee, Cork, Ireland, IE, T12 X8N6
Last Update: 01/04/2026
At Johnson Controls, we transform the environments where people live, work, learn and play. As the global leader in smart, healthy and sustainable buildings, our mission is to reimagine the performance of buildings to serve people, places and the planet. Building on ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

HYDAC Australia & New Zealand







Johnson Controls






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for HYDAC Australia & New Zealand in 2026.
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Johnson Controls in 2026.
Incident History - HYDAC Australia & New Zealand (X = Date, Y = Severity)
HYDAC Australia & New Zealand cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Johnson Controls (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Johnson Controls cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

HYDAC Australia & New Zealand

Johnson Controls
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.