Comparison Overview
HUAWEI eKit

HUAWEI eKit
HUAWEI Industrial Base, Bantian, Longgang District, Shenzhen, CN
Last Update: 12/02/2026
Help SMEs go digital and accelerate transformation

Primary School
2452, AU
Last Update: 01/04/2026
www.primaryschool.com.au is a directory of sites for students and lesson plans and reference material for teachers and parents. It is currently averaging up to 350,000 unique visitors a month and has over 44,000 subscribers to its free weekly newsletter which showcases ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

HUAWEI eKit







Primary School






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for HUAWEI eKit in 2026.
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Primary School in 2026.
Incident History - HUAWEI eKit (X = Date, Y = Severity)
HUAWEI eKit cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Primary School (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Primary School cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

HUAWEI eKit

Primary School
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.