Comparison Overview
Huawei Cloud for Technology Partners APAC

Huawei Cloud for Technology Partners APAC
348, Jalan Tun Razak, Kuala Lumpur, 50400, MY
Last Update: 12/02/2026
The HUAWEI CLOUD Partner Network (HCPN) is a global partner program for HUAWEI CLOUD. We’re focused on helping HCPN partners build success on HUAWEI CLOUD by providing valuable business, technical, and marketing support. HCPN Technology Partners are commercial software...

SONDA
Teatinos 500, Santiago, CL
Last Update: 13/09/2026
We are at the forefront of digital transformation in the Americas, positively impacting the lives of over 500 million people. As a key player in emerging industries, we drive innovation and change through ambitious modernization projects and cutting-edge solutions. By u...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Huawei Cloud for Technology Partners APAC







SONDA






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Information Technology & Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Huawei Cloud for Technology Partners APAC in 2026.
Incidents vs Information Technology & Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SONDA in 2026.
Incident History - Huawei Cloud for Technology Partners APAC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Huawei Cloud for Technology Partners APAC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - SONDA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SONDA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Huawei Cloud for Technology Partners APAC

SONDA
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.