Comparison Overview
HRSD

HRSD
1434 Air Rail Ave, Virginia Beach, 23455, US
Last Update: 29/03/2026
Welcome. Since HRSD's inception, there has been one overriding mission -- to protect public health and the waters of Hampton Roads by treating wastewater effectively. HRSD returns treated effluent to nature in a way that will continue to nurture our water's delicate eco...

PT PLN (Persero)
Jl. Trunojoyo Blok M I/135, Jakarta Selatan, 12160, ID
Last Update: 04/09/2026
Indonesia State Electricity Corporation PLN has a long history in electricity industry of Indonesia. As the sole provider of electricity in Indonesia, PLN is striving to increase quality of services to all Indonesian. In 1972, in accordance with Government Regulation N...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

HRSD







PT PLN (Persero)






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Utilities Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for HRSD in 2026.
Incidents vs Utilities Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PT PLN (Persero) in 2026.
Incident History - HRSD (X = Date, Y = Severity)
HRSD cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - PT PLN (Persero) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PT PLN (Persero) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

HRSD

PT PLN (Persero)
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.