Comparison Overview
Hologic, Inc.

Hologic, Inc.
250 Campus Drive, Marlborough, 01752, US
Last Update: 31/03/2026
We’re an innovative medical technology company whose purpose is to enable healthier lives everywhere, every day. While we discover and develop groundbreaking products and services that benefit everyone, we are especially passionate about those that advance women’s healt...

Olympus Corporation
Nishi-shinjuku 2-3-1 Shinjuku Monolith, Shinjuku-ku, JP
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Olympus is passionate about creating customer-driven solutions for the medical industry. For more than 100 years, Olympus has focused on making people’s lives healthier, safer and more fulfilling by helping detect, prevent, and treat disease, furthering scientific resea...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Hologic, Inc.







Olympus Corporation






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Medical Equipment Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Hologic, Inc. in 2026.
Incidents vs Medical Equipment Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Olympus Corporation in 2026.
Incident History - Hologic, Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Hologic, Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Olympus Corporation (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Olympus Corporation cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Hologic, Inc.

Olympus Corporation
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.