Comparison Overview
Hitachi ZeroCarbon

Hitachi ZeroCarbon
Broadgate Tower, London, England, EC2A 2EW, GB
Last Update: 05/04/2026
Hitachi ZeroCarbon is a technology company on a mission to accelerate the global transition to zero carbon today, in order to pioneer the world of tomorrow. We simplify the whole decarbonisation process so you can focus on delivering for your customers. Through a lon...

NCS Group
Singapore, 5 Ang Mo Kio Street 62, NCS Hub, Singapore, SG, 569141
Last Update: 15/09/2026
NCS, a subsidiary of Singtel Group, is a leading technology services firm with presence in Asia Pacific and partners with governments and enterprises to advance communities through technology. Combining the experience and expertise of its 14,000-strong team across 56 sp...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Hitachi ZeroCarbon







NCS Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Hitachi ZeroCarbon in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for NCS Group in 2026.
Incident History - Hitachi ZeroCarbon (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Hitachi ZeroCarbon cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - NCS Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
NCS Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Hitachi ZeroCarbon

NCS Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.