Comparison Overview
Absolute Results

Absolute Results
104 - 2677 192nd St, Surrey, BC, CA, V3Z 3X1
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Want to sell a week's worth of cars in 1-2 days? As Canada's largest automobile marketing company, we maximize your marketing dollars to bring in customers who are ready to buy your dealerships's vehicles. Absolute Results specializes in database marketing, salesperson...

Joyson Group
99, Qingyi Road, Ningbo, Zhejiang, CN, 315000
Last Update: 11/09/2026
Joyson Group is a young, ambitious high-tech company, its headquarter is located in Ningbo, China. With more than 100 bases in 30 countries, over 40000 employees globally. Founded in 2004, Joyson 's main products used to be automotive functional components. Since 201...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Absolute Results







Joyson Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Absolute Results in 2026.
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Joyson Group in 2026.
Incident History - Absolute Results (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Absolute Results cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Joyson Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Joyson Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Absolute Results

Joyson Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.