Comparison Overview
Hatch Pty Ltd

Hatch Pty Ltd
N/A
Last Update: 26/02/2026
Hatch – We are engineers. We are consultants. We are project and construction managers. Hatch is a privately owned, multi-disciplinary professional services company, serving the mining, metallurgical, energy and infrastructure sectors. Our focus is on helping cli...

Orica
1 Nicholson St, East Melbourne, 3000, AU
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Our story began in 1874, when we first supplied explosives to the Victorian goldfields in Australia. Since then, we have grown to become one of the world’s leading mining and infrastructure solutions providers. From the production and supply of explosives, blasting s...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Hatch Pty Ltd







Orica






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Mining Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Hatch Pty Ltd in 2026.
Incidents vs Mining Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Orica in 2026.
Incident History - Hatch Pty Ltd (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Hatch Pty Ltd cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Orica (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Orica cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Hatch Pty Ltd

Orica
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Ironic before 38.0.1, the autodetect deploy interface may fail to run cleaning immediately after enrollment with, or changing to, the autodetect deploy interface.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's exported logs feature. An unauthenticated attacker with a valid file ID could download exported action logs without proper authorization. While file IDs are complex, they can be intercepted from plaintext email or webhook callbacks. This vulnerability leads to information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data such as usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and action-specific metadata.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's Stripe billing webhook handler. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge billing events by sending crafted JSON requests to the `/webhooks/stripe` endpoint without validating the Stripe-Signature header. Successful exploitation can lead to the unauthorized resetting of a namespace's build quota to its maximum and trigger unsolicited billing emails to namespace administrators.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. When the SECURITY_SCANNER_V4_PSK (pre-shared key) is not set, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send POST requests to the security scanner notification endpoint. This allows the attacker to flood the notification queue and inject path traversal characters into Clair API URL paths. The primary consequence is worker resource exhaustion and blind path manipulation on the configured Clair host, potentially leading to a denial of service.