Comparison Overview
Harris Boats

Harris Boats
1111 N Hadley Rd, Fort Wayne, 46804, US
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Pete and Ernie Harris founded Harris® in 1957 in Fort Wayne, Indiana, jumpstarting America’s love affair with the pontoon boat. They pioneered many of the features we call standard on pontoons today, like aluminum tubes, motor pods, upholstered seats, and Harris’ patent...

Alpargatas S.A.
Av. das Nações Unidas, 14.261, São Paulo, 04794-000, BR
Last Update: 01/04/2026
We are a global company, founded and based in Brazil for over 115 years. We are committed to delight the world with amazing brands, that convey lightness and joy to the everyday lives of our consumers. We own Havaianas brand, world leader in open shoes, known for the ic...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Harris Boats







Alpargatas S.A.






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Harris Boats in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Alpargatas S.A. in 2026.
Incident History - Harris Boats (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Harris Boats cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Alpargatas S.A. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Alpargatas S.A. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Harris Boats

Alpargatas S.A.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
HedgeDoc is an open source, real-time collaborative markdown notes application. Prior to 1.11.0, the GitHub Gist export flow created an OAuth2 state value but only checked that it was present rather than validating it against the value expected for the user's session. Because the state was not properly validated, an attacker could forge a callback URL containing their own valid GitHub OAuth code. When processing the callback, HedgeDoc used the victim's logged-in session to select which note to export, but the attacker's authorization code to determine which GitHub account received it. As a result, a logged-in victim who clicked a crafted link could export their own private, protected, or limited note directly into a Gist controlled by the attacker. This issue has been fixed in version 1.11.0.
HedgeDoc is an open source, real-time, collaborative, markdown notes application. Prior to version 1.11.0, HedgeDoc was vulnerable to a YAML alias bomb due to unsafe processing of the note frontmatter. HedgeDoc parsed frontmatter with js-yaml.load (js-yaml v3) via @hedgedoc/meta-marked, which resolved YAML anchor aliases. A compact malicious payload could therefore expand into a huge object structure, consuming excessive CPU. This expansion ran on every request to the publish view (/s/<shortid>) and, when placed under the opengraph key, the editor view (/<noteId>). A ten-level alias bomb could block the single Node.js event loop for roughly 235 seconds per request, causing concurrent requests to hang or drop and rendering the instance unavailable (DoS). Because the note was stored in the database, the impact survived process restarts until the note was removed. toobusy-js did not reliably mitigate the worst cases, as the event loop was saturated before the middleware could respond. This issue was fixed in version 1.11.0.
Crypt::OpenSSL::X509 versions before 2.1.3 for Perl allow a heap out-of-bounds read via a long certificate extension OID in hv_exts. When building the extension hash (via extensions(), extensions_by_long_name(), extensions_by_oid(), or has_extension_oid()), the code passes OBJ_obj2txt()'s return value as the hash-key length; because that value is the OID's full text length rather than the bytes written to the fixed-size buffer (129 bytes), an OID whose text is longer than the 129-byte buffer causes a read past the allocation, exposing adjacent heap memory as the returned hash key. extensions_by_name() uses the static shortname path and is not affected.
Crypt::OpenSSL::X509 versions before 2.1.3 for Perl allow denial of service via NULL pointer dereference. X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext) returns NULL when an extension's DER value fails to parse. basicC, ia5string, and auth_att dereference its result without a NULL check. keyid_data also dereferences akid->keyid, which is NULL for an empty AKI SEQUENCE (DER 30 00) even when the parse succeeds. A caller invoking an affected helper on an extension from an untrusted certificate triggers a SIGSEGV that crashes the Perl process.
Cockpit CMS contains a path traversal vulnerability in the Bucket file storage API (/system/buckets/api). The api() method in modules/System/Controller/Buckets.php sanitizes the bucket name with preg_replace('/[^a-zA-Z0-9-_\\.]/','', $bucket), which permits '..' and '../' sequences. The sanitized value is interpolated into a Flysystem path as uploads://buckets/{bucket}. Flysystem's WhitespacePathNormalizer resolves 'buckets/..' to the empty string (the uploads storage root) without raising PathTraversalDetected because the '..' has a preceding component to consume. An authenticated low-privileged user can send a crafted request with a '../' bucket name to list, upload, and delete files across all buckets, including those belonging to other users or roles
- https://gist.github.com/sermikr0/821c4edd3c34e98a62a50b07707785bd
- https://github.com/Cockpit-HQ/Cockpit/commit/dde2d1d74f5f4e11de42a298918ea8c9684f932c
- https://github.com/cockpit-hq/cockpit
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/cockpit-cms-missing-authorization-in-bucket-file-storage-api
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/cockpit-cms-path-traversal-via-bucket-name-in-bucket-file-storage-api