Comparison Overview
Hapvida NotreDame Intermédica

Hapvida NotreDame Intermédica
Av. Paulista 867, São Paulo, SP, BR, 01311-100
Last Update: 28/03/2026
Com 80 anos de experiência, a Hapvida é hoje a maior empresa de saúde integrada da América Latina. A companhia, que possui mais de 73 mil colaboradores, atende 16 milhões de beneficiários de saúde e odontologia espalhados pelas cinco regiões do Brasil. Todo o aparato ...

Health Care Service Corporation
300 E Randolph St, Chicago, 60601, US
Last Update: 11/09/2026
Health Care Service Corporation serves nearly 23 million people across the United States through its portfolio of health benefit solutions. HCSC provides health coverage options for employers large and small, individuals and families, and Medicare and Medicaid plans. H...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Hapvida NotreDame Intermédica







Health Care Service Corporation






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Hapvida NotreDame Intermédica in 2026.
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Health Care Service Corporation in 2026.
Incident History - Hapvida NotreDame Intermédica (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Hapvida NotreDame Intermédica cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Health Care Service Corporation (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Health Care Service Corporation cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Hapvida NotreDame Intermédica

Health Care Service Corporation
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.