Comparison Overview
Grupo Haganá
Grupo Haganá
Rua Cruzeiro, 549, São Paulo, São Paulo, undefined, BR
Last Update: 30/12/2025
O que é trabalhar no Grupo Haganá? É ter uma missão. É ter valores. É ter uma filosofia. Trabalhar aqui é fazer parte de um time. Um grande time! Somos quase 12 mil colaboradores que fazem do Grupo Haganá sinônimo de segurança em São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Paraná e M...
G4S
6th Floor, London, SW1H 0DB, GB
Last Update: 01/04/2026
G4S is a leading security and facility services company that provides proactive security services and cutting-edge smart technology to deliver tailored, integrated security solutions that allow clients to focus on their core business. Through a global workforce of appro...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Grupo Haganá
G4S
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Security and Investigations Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Grupo Haganá in 2026.
Incidents vs Security and Investigations Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for G4S in 2026.
Incident History - Grupo Haganá (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Grupo Haganá cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - G4S (X = Date, Y = Severity)
G4S cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Grupo Haganá
G4S
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Spinnaker is an open source, multi-cloud continuous delivery platform. Prior to versions 2026.1.1, 2026.0.3, 2025.4.4, and 2025.3.4 on their respective release lines, Kustomize bake operations allow unsafe YAML tag processing in rosco manifests. This can lead to remote code execution on rosco pods when performing Kustomize bakes. This issue is fixed in versions 2026.1.1, 2026.0.3, 2025.4.4, and 2025.3.4.
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/commit/2d75818b85cc4c35144d5e5ed45e7340fcab5dfe
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/commit/bbc30c9b9034a056e95f012fa1b34e9fd703cae7
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/commit/de5a7a05af35aee19eb71d289cd0b77f67509009
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/commit/df32d568e82519d9f3896fc9007baba0077c87fd
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/commit/f5cec213f8cf207843ed5a6929395960a1ca094f
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/releases/tag/rosco-2025.3.4
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/releases/tag/rosco-2025.4.4
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/releases/tag/rosco-2026.0.3
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/releases/tag/rosco-2026.1.1
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/releases/tag/rosco-2026.2.0
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/security/advisories/GHSA-p68j-q7hf-3qcp
Multiple connections to the backend using the same charging station ID are allowed, which could allow an attacker to deploy multiple instances of malicious OCPP clients to overwhelm the backend.
Previously, there was no throttling on repeated authentication attempts to the charging station backend, which could allow an attacker to execute a denial-of-service attack.
The charging station websocket endpoint accepts connections without proper authentication, which could lead to privilege escalation.
vulnerability in Drupal Commerce guest registration allows . This issue affects Commerce guest registration versions: *.*.