Comparison Overview
HAECO

HAECO
80 South Perimeter Road, Hong Kong, HK
Last Update: 03/04/2026
HAECO Group is one of the world’s leading aircraft engineering and maintenance service providers. We provide a comprehensive range of solutions encompassing airframe services, line services, component overhaul, aero-structure repairs, landing gear services, engine servi...

IndiGo (InterGlobe Aviation Ltd)
Level 1, Tower C, Global Business Park,, Gurgaon, 122 002, IN
Last Update: 21/09/2026
IndiGo is India’s largest passenger airline. We operate with focus on our three pillars – offering low fares, being on-time and delivering a courteous and hassle-free experience. IndiGo has become synonymous with being on-time. Since our inception in August 2006, we ha...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

HAECO







IndiGo (InterGlobe Aviation Ltd)






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Airlines and Aviation Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for HAECO in 2026.
Incidents vs Airlines and Aviation Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for IndiGo (InterGlobe Aviation Ltd) in 2026.
Incident History - HAECO (X = Date, Y = Severity)
HAECO cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - IndiGo (InterGlobe Aviation Ltd) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
IndiGo (InterGlobe Aviation Ltd) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

HAECO

IndiGo (InterGlobe Aviation Ltd)
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.