Comparison Overview
H2I Group Technical Products Division

H2I Group Technical Products Division
430 Industrial Blvd NE, Minneapolis, 55413, US
Last Update: 05/01/2026
From budgeting to design, project management to installation, The H2I Technical Education Products Division is there every step of the way. To better educate students, we understand and focus on helping our clients keep up with the technological change. Our specialized ...

VINCI Construction
1973, Boulevard de la Défense, Nanterre, 92000, FR
Last Update: 16/09/2026
Premier groupe français et acteur mondial de premier plan de la construction, VINCI Construction réunit plus de 830 entreprises et près de 69000 collaborateurs dans une centaine de pays. Ses expertises s’étendent à l’ensemble des métiers du bâtiment, du génie civil, et ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

H2I Group Technical Products Division







VINCI Construction






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for H2I Group Technical Products Division in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for VINCI Construction in 2026.
Incident History - H2I Group Technical Products Division (X = Date, Y = Severity)
H2I Group Technical Products Division cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - VINCI Construction (X = Date, Y = Severity)
VINCI Construction cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

H2I Group Technical Products Division

VINCI Construction
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.