Comparison Overview
Guild Correspondent

Guild Correspondent
5887 Copley Drive, San Diego, 92111, US
Last Update: 01/01/2026
As a correspondent partner of Guild, you have a dedicated team of professionals to help you every step of the way. Disclosure: https://files.constantcontact.com/095c58ed001/2a7f043f-5886-432c-ba8a-e5dc9b79c67d.pdf

JPMorganChase
270 Park Avenue, New York, NY, US, 10017-2014
Last Update: 11/09/2026
With a history tracing its roots to 1799 in New York City, JPMorganChase is one of the world's oldest, largest, and best-known financial institutions—carrying forth the innovative spirit of our heritage firms in global operations across 100 markets. We serve millions ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Guild Correspondent







JPMorganChase






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Guild Correspondent in 2026.
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for JPMorganChase in 2026.
Incident History - Guild Correspondent (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Guild Correspondent cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - JPMorganChase (X = Date, Y = Severity)
JPMorganChase cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Guild Correspondent

JPMorganChase
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.