Comparison Overview
GSE Iberia

GSE Iberia
Avenida Diagonal 433, planta 1º, puerta 2, Barcelona, ES-08036, ES
Last Update: 05/02/2026
GSE es una empresa con casi 50 años de historia, perteneciente al grupo GOLDBECK, con una amplia implantación en Europa, y también en China. Está presente en España desde 1998, y en Portugal desde 2020. Líder en el sector y capaz de acompañar a sus clientes internaci...

Andrade Gutierrez S.A.
Avª das Nações Unidas 12495, São Paulo, 04578-000, BR
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Fundada em Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, a Andrade Gutierrez tem reconhecida expertise no segmento de construção pesada. Na década de 1990 iniciou a diversificação dos negócios com investimentos nas áreas de Concessões e Telecomunicações. Hoje o Grupo Andrade Gutier...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

GSE Iberia







Andrade Gutierrez S.A.






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for GSE Iberia in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Andrade Gutierrez S.A. in 2026.
Incident History - GSE Iberia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
GSE Iberia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Andrade Gutierrez S.A. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Andrade Gutierrez S.A. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

GSE Iberia

Andrade Gutierrez S.A.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.