Comparison Overview
Grupo Éxito

Grupo Éxito
Carrera 48 #32 B Sur - 139, Envigado, 472, CO
Last Update: 05/04/2026
En Grupo Éxito evolucionamos junto a nuestros clientes, adaptándonos a las nuevas formas de consumo a través de la innovación, la transformación digital, las experiencias y la sostenibilidad. Como parte de la plataforma de retail más grande de Suramérica, estamos presen...

Advance Auto Parts
2635 E. Millbrook Road, Raleigh, NC, US, 27604
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Advance Auto Parts, Inc. is a leading automotive aftermarket parts provider that serves both professional installers and do-it-yourself customers. As of October 5, 2024, Advance operated 4,781 stores primarily within the United States, with additional locations in Canad...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Grupo Éxito







Advance Auto Parts






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Grupo Éxito in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Advance Auto Parts in 2026.
Incident History - Grupo Éxito (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Grupo Éxito cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Advance Auto Parts (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Advance Auto Parts cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Grupo Éxito

Advance Auto Parts
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Spinnaker is an open source, multi-cloud continuous delivery platform. Prior to versions 2026.1.1, 2026.0.3, 2025.4.4, and 2025.3.4 on their respective release lines, Kustomize bake operations allow unsafe YAML tag processing in rosco manifests. This can lead to remote code execution on rosco pods when performing Kustomize bakes. This issue is fixed in versions 2026.1.1, 2026.0.3, 2025.4.4, and 2025.3.4.
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/commit/2d75818b85cc4c35144d5e5ed45e7340fcab5dfe
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/commit/bbc30c9b9034a056e95f012fa1b34e9fd703cae7
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/commit/de5a7a05af35aee19eb71d289cd0b77f67509009
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/commit/df32d568e82519d9f3896fc9007baba0077c87fd
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/commit/f5cec213f8cf207843ed5a6929395960a1ca094f
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/releases/tag/rosco-2025.3.4
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/releases/tag/rosco-2025.4.4
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/releases/tag/rosco-2026.0.3
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/releases/tag/rosco-2026.1.1
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/releases/tag/rosco-2026.2.0
- https://github.com/spinnaker/spinnaker/security/advisories/GHSA-p68j-q7hf-3qcp
Multiple connections to the backend using the same charging station ID are allowed, which could allow an attacker to deploy multiple instances of malicious OCPP clients to overwhelm the backend.
Previously, there was no throttling on repeated authentication attempts to the charging station backend, which could allow an attacker to execute a denial-of-service attack.
The charging station websocket endpoint accepts connections without proper authentication, which could lead to privilege escalation.
vulnerability in Drupal Commerce guest registration allows . This issue affects Commerce guest registration versions: *.*.