Comparison Overview
Grupo Proeza

Grupo Proeza
Avenida Constitucion 405, Monterrey, NL, 64000, MX
Last Update: 02/12/2025
Grupo Proeza is a Portfolio Management Company, headquartered in Monterrey, Nuevo León, Mexico. Focused on building long-term business ecosystems within the Industrial, Agribusiness and Healthcare Industries. Formed by its companies: Metalsa, Proeza Ventures, Citrofrut,...

Anadolu Group
Anadolu Grubu, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Mahallesi, Balkan Caddesi No. 58 Buyaka E Blok Tepeüstü, Ümraniye, ISTANBUL, Türkiye, TR, 34771
Last Update: 02/09/2026
We maintain our activities in 8 industries (retail, soft drinks, beer, agriculture, automotive, stationery, energy and health) and in 20 countries with more than 80 companies, approximately 100 production facilities, 6 R&D centers and 100,000 employees. Our Group, which...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Grupo Proeza







Anadolu Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Holding Companies Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Grupo Proeza in 2026.
Incidents vs Holding Companies Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Anadolu Group in 2026.
Incident History - Grupo Proeza (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Grupo Proeza cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Anadolu Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Anadolu Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Grupo Proeza

Anadolu Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Trident versions v25.02.1 through v26.06.1 are susceptible to a vulnerability that could allow an authenticated attacker with access to debug logs to view LUKS passphrases or SMB Active Directory credentials.
Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Prior to 0.5.0, the Rust and Go RA-TLS challenge verifiers accepted quote ReportData that was bound to the certificate public key and client nonce but not to the active TLS session before permitting application traffic. An attacker who obtained an enclave TLS private key could relay a genuine quote onto another connection, causing the clients to accept an attacker-terminated connection as the attested enclave. This issue is fixed in 0.5.0.
Enclave OS Virtual runs container workloads inside confidential virtual machines with end-to-end attestation. Prior to tdx-v0.2.43 and tdx-gpu-v0.6.27, the TDX/GPU RA-TLS certificate issuer placed the certificate public-key hash and client nonce in quote ReportData but omitted a value bound to the active TLS session. An attacker who obtained an enclave TLS private key could relay a genuine quote onto another connection, causing a relying party to accept an attacker-terminated connection as the attested enclave. This issue is fixed in tdx-v0.2.43 and tdx-gpu-v0.6.27.
- https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-virtual/commit/9a6be91e29f2b6738d0b77c33cd1ad5cd3d8a347
- https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-virtual/releases/tag/tdx-gpu-v0.6.27
- https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-virtual/releases/tag/tdx-v0.2.43
- https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-virtual/security/advisories/GHSA-p5fp-g94g-g9m9
- https://privasys.org/blog/binding-attestation-to-the-tls-session
Privasys Go is a maintained fork of the Go programming language that adds RA-TLS support to crypto/tls. Prior to privasys-v0.5.1-go1.26.5, challenge-mode RA-TLS certificates bound quote ReportData to the certificate public key and client nonce but not to the active TLS session. An attacker who obtained an enclave TLS private key could relay a genuine quote onto another connection, causing a relying party to accept a handshake terminated by the attacker as an attested enclave connection. This issue is fixed in privasys-v0.5.1-go1.26.5.
Aegisub is a cross-platform advanced subtitle editor. From 3.2.0 to 3.4.2, Aegisub automatically loads Automation scripts referenced by `Automation Scripts` metadata in `ASS` subtitle projects without asking whether the user trusts the scripts or their authors. An attacker can distribute a crafted `ASS` file together with a referenced malicious Automation script, and opening the `AS` file executes arbitrary code with the privileges of the Aegisub process. From 3.4.0 to 3.4.2, inconsistent handling of embedded `NUL` characters between extension validation and filesystem operations additionally allows a crafted `ASS/Lua` polyglot to reference and execute itself as a single-file variant. The vulnerability is fixed in Aegisub 3.5.0.
- https://github.com/TypesettingTools/Aegisub/commit/0a3073d59f10432eeebea65018b02ef4d0a87fff
- https://github.com/TypesettingTools/Aegisub/commit/b5bf23979e7453f7b1cc8ffeb82b3cc2d2ca75e6
- https://github.com/TypesettingTools/Aegisub/commit/e4099055711cce327840870c050ce46e58f4aee0
- https://github.com/TypesettingTools/Aegisub/security/advisories/GHSA-67hq-5vgg-6f23