Comparison Overview
Grow @ Nagarro

Grow @ Nagarro
N/A
Last Update: 28/03/2026
This page is your inside look at what it’s like to be a Nagarrian. You’ll find stories of bold ideas, inclusive culture, real career journeys, learning moments, and the little things that make us who we are. From real stories to behind-the-scenes snapshots, it’s all her...

Ingram Micro
3351 Michelson Drive, Suite 100, Irvine, 92612, US
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Ingram Micro is a leading technology company for the global information technology ecosystem. With the ability to reach nearly 90% of the global population, we play a vital role in the worldwide IT sales channel, bringing products and services from technology manufactur...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Grow @ Nagarro







Ingram Micro






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Grow @ Nagarro in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
Ingram Micro has 1.96% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Grow @ Nagarro (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Grow @ Nagarro cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Ingram Micro (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ingram Micro cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Grow @ Nagarro

Ingram Micro
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.