Comparison Overview
SMABTP

SMABTP
8, Rue Louis Armand, Paris, Île-de-France, FR, 75015
Last Update: 02/04/2026
With 4,400 employees, SMABTP provides insurance coverage for over 200,000 clients and members, meeting all their insurance needs — from businesses, professionals, artisans, and executives to individual customers. For over 165 years, SMABTP has specialized in professiona...

Seguros SURA
Edificio Suramericana Carrera 64 B 49 A 30, Medellín, Antioquia, CO
Last Update: 03/04/2026
SURA es una compañía que integra en diferentes empresas soluciones en seguros y seguridad social. Su marca se presenta a los clientes como Seguros SURA, ARL SURA y EPS SURA. Existen otras marcas y empresas, especialmente de prestación de servicios, que hacen parte de la...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

SMABTP







Seguros SURA






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SMABTP in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Seguros SURA in 2026.
Incident History - SMABTP (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SMABTP cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Seguros SURA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Seguros SURA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

SMABTP

Seguros SURA
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.