Comparison Overview
Great Clips Inc.

Great Clips Inc.
4400 W. 78th St., Minneapolis, 55435, US
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Established in Minneapolis in 1982, Great Clips has grown to be the world's largest and fastest growing salon brand. There are more than 4,400 salons throughout the United States and Canada -- all of them owned by franchisees. Visit us at www.greatclips.com Employment ...

Verisure
Global HQ - Versoix, Geneva, CH, 1290
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Verisure is the leading provider of peace of mind and protection to residential and small business customers across Europe and Latin America. We deliver professionally-monitored security services to over 6 million customers in 18 countries across Europe and Latin Amer...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Great Clips Inc.







Verisure






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Consumer Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Great Clips Inc. in 2026.
Incidents vs Consumer Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Verisure in 2026.
Incident History - Great Clips Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Great Clips Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Verisure (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Verisure cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Great Clips Inc.

Verisure
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.