Comparison Overview
Great Eastern

Great Eastern
1 Pickering Street , Singapore, 048659, SG
Last Update: 05/09/2026
For 117 years, we have been helping customers across generations by protecting, preserving and growing what matters to them. As One Great Eastern Group today, we are enabling the goals of over 15.5 million customers by taking care of their needs across life, health, wea...

Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield
120 Monument Circle, Indianapolis, 46204, US
Last Update: 03/09/2026
At Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield we understand our health connects us to each other. What we all do impacts those around us. So Anthem is dedicated to delivering better care to our members, providing greater value to our customers and helping improve the health of o...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Great Eastern







Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Great Eastern in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield in 2026.
Incident History - Great Eastern (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Great Eastern cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Great Eastern

Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.