Comparison Overview
GRAV®

GRAV®
Austin, Texas, US, 78744
Last Update: 22/09/2026
21 years of age or older. A beloved brand from Austin, TX. GRAV wants to better understand and stand beside more of you, the community of smokers and advocates nationwide who support our way of life. We are deeply invested in the well-being of our colleagues, our custo...

Lojas Renner S.A.
Av. Joaquim Porto Villanova, 401, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, BR, 91410400
Last Update: 14/09/2026
We are a fashion and lifestyle ecosystem connected to our customers through digital channels and more than 600 stores in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. From the beginning, everything we do is to enchant. This is how our story began, in 1965, conquering important milesto...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

GRAV®







Lojas Renner S.A.






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
GRAV® has 43.82% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Lojas Renner S.A. in 2026.
Incident History - GRAV® (X = Date, Y = Severity)
GRAV® cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Lojas Renner S.A. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Lojas Renner S.A. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

GRAV®

Lojas Renner S.A.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.