Comparison Overview
Godrej Security Solutions

Godrej Security Solutions
Pirojshanagar Road, Mumbai, 400079, IN
Last Update: 08/01/2026
As challenges have advanced, so have solutions. Godrej Security Solutions believes it needs to constantly stay ahead and keep pace with the latest technology to meet growing needs. Godrej Security Solutions is one of the Divisions of Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. and ...

Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd.
Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd., Mumbai, 400079, IN
Last Update: 06/09/2026
Godrej is one of India’s most trusted brands serving over 1.1bn customers worldwide, every day. Godrej & Boyce, a Godrej group company, began it's journey in 1897 with the manufacture of high quality locks and continues with its outstanding engineering capabilities ac...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Godrej Security Solutions







Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd.






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Godrej Security Solutions in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. in 2026.
Incident History - Godrej Security Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Godrej Security Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Godrej Security Solutions

Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.