Comparison Overview
Globo Gente

Globo Gente
Rio de Janeiro, BR
Last Update: 27/01/2026
Globo Gente é a plataforma de conhecimento e insights da Globo para pessoas, parceiros e anunciantes que queiram saber mais sobre comportamento, valores e hábitos dos brasileiros, e assim enriquecer a visão de um Brasil plural e diverso, contribuindo com informações rel...

Havas
29/30 Quai de Dion Bouton, Puteaux, FR, 92800
Last Update: 05/09/2026
Founded in 1835 in Paris, Havas is one of the world’s largest global communications groups, with nearly 23,000 people in over 100 countries. With the ambition to help brands unlock Growth, Powered by Desire, Havas brings together creativity, media, technology and produc...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Globo Gente







Havas






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Advertising Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Globo Gente in 2026.
Incidents vs Advertising Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Havas in 2026.
Incident History - Globo Gente (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Globo Gente cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Havas (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Havas cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Globo Gente

Havas
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.