Comparison Overview
TD SYNNEX Global Computing Components

TD SYNNEX Global Computing Components
Carrer de l'Acer, 30, Barcelona, Catalonia, 08038, ES
Last Update: 25/02/2026
TD SYNNEX Global Computing Components (GCC) is a business unit within TD SYNNEX dedicated to source the best computing components and help its partners develop custom hardware solutions at any scale. We’re an innovative partner for more than 30.000 customers across Eur...

DXC Technology
20408 Bashan Dr, Ashburn, 20147, US
Last Update: 15/09/2026
DXC Technology helps global companies run their mission-critical systems and operations while modernizing IT, optimizing data architectures, and ensuring security and scalability across public, private and hybrid clouds. The world's largest companies and public sector o...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

TD SYNNEX Global Computing Components







DXC Technology






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for TD SYNNEX Global Computing Components in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for DXC Technology in 2026.
Incident History - TD SYNNEX Global Computing Components (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TD SYNNEX Global Computing Components cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - DXC Technology (X = Date, Y = Severity)
DXC Technology cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

TD SYNNEX Global Computing Components

DXC Technology
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.