Comparison Overview
Gibbs & Cox Australia

Gibbs & Cox Australia
53 Wentworth Avenue, Kingston, 2621, AU
Last Update: 09/03/2026
Leidos Gibbs & Cox Australia provide naval architecture, marine engineering, shipbuilding, nuclear engineering, and maritime infrastructure engineering across the system lifecycle. Our capabilities include ships, submarines, boats, marine autonomous systems, and constru...

ST Engineering
ST Engineering Hub, Singapore, 567710, SG
Last Update: 11/09/2026
At ST Engineering, we apply our technology and innovation to solve real-world problems and improve lives. Our commitment to excellence and our track record as a global technology, defence, and engineering company earns us a reputation for quality and trust. Subsc...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Gibbs & Cox Australia







ST Engineering






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Engineering Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Gibbs & Cox Australia in 2026.
Incidents vs Engineering Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ST Engineering in 2026.
Incident History - Gibbs & Cox Australia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Gibbs & Cox Australia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - ST Engineering (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ST Engineering cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Gibbs & Cox Australia

ST Engineering
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.