Comparison Overview
GIANT

GIANT
N/A
Last Update: 20/03/2026
GIANT creates a positive, convenient shopping experience that fits into the lives of today's busy customers - no matter where or how they need us. Drawing on nearly 100 years of heritage, over 33,000 team members put our promises into action every day, all with the simp...

Tesco
Shire Park, Welwyn Garden City, AL7 1GA, GB
Last Update: 02/04/2026
One of the world’s largest retailers of consumer goods from food to fashion. Serving our customers, communities and planet a little better every day in our stores and online is at the heart of everything we do. Founded in 1919 by Jack Cohen using the £30 he received on...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

GIANT







Tesco






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for GIANT in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
Tesco has 5.66% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - GIANT (X = Date, Y = Severity)
GIANT cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Tesco (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Tesco cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

GIANT

Tesco
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.