Comparison Overview
GCI Communication Corp.

GCI Communication Corp.
2550 Denali Street, Suite 100, Anchorage, AK, US, 99503
Last Update: 17/03/2026
Hi, we’re glad you’re here! GCI is Alaska’s largest telecommunications provider. We’re headquartered in Anchorage where we’ve served our neighbors for more than 40 years. GCI employs nearly 2,000 Alaskans and has invested more than $4 billion in its Alaska network and f...

Telekom Malaysia
Jalan Pantai Baharu, Kuala Lumpur, 50672, MY
Last Update: 01/04/2026
TM is the national connectivity and digital infrastructure provider and Malaysia’s leading integrated telco; offering a comprehensive suite of communication services and solutions in fixed (telephony and broadband), mobility, content, WiFi, ICT, Cloud and smart services...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

GCI Communication Corp.







Telekom Malaysia






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for GCI Communication Corp. in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Telekom Malaysia in 2026.
Incident History - GCI Communication Corp. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
GCI Communication Corp. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Telekom Malaysia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Telekom Malaysia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

GCI Communication Corp.

Telekom Malaysia
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Fides is an open-source privacy engineering platform. From version 2.33.0 to before version 2.84.5, there is a DOM-based XSS vulnerability in fides.js via the fides_description override. This issue has been patched in version 2.84.5.
WACRM prior to commit 73041bf contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the automation engine that allows authenticated attackers to access and modify contacts belonging to other tenants by supplying an arbitrary caller-controlled contact_id in the POST request body without tenant ownership verification. Attackers can exploit the service-role client that bypasses row-level security to modify victim contact fields including name, email, and company across tenant boundaries using only a known contact UUID.
Namespace attributes are not encoded correctly during HTML serialization. This allows bypassing the cross-site scripting prevention mechanism of typo3/html-sanitizer before version 2.3.2.
When ALLOW_INSECURE_RAW_TEXT is enabled, whitespace-variant closing tags (e.g., </style\t>) are not recognized by the sanitizer but accepted by browsers as valid end tags, allowing subsequent content to escape sanitization. This allows bypassing the cross-site scripting prevention mechanism of typo3/html-sanitizer before version 2.3.2.
Headplane is a feature-complete Web UI for Headscale. Prior to versions 0.6.3 and 0.7.0-beta.3, Headplane was vulnerable to a path traversal / authorization bypass in the Headscale API client used by node and user rename operations. This issue has been patched in versions 0.6.3 and 0.7.0-beta.3.