Comparison Overview
Galp

Galp
Avenida da Índia 8, Alcântara, Lisbon, 1349-065, PT
Last Update: 18/02/2026
Galp is an energy company committed to the development of efficient solutions in its operations and in the integrated services it offers to customers. We create simple, flexible and competitive solutions for the energy or mobility needs of both large industries and smal...

Amec Foster Wheeler
15 Justice Mill Lane, Aberdeen, AB11 6EQ, GB
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Wood Group has combined with Amec Foster Wheeler to form a new global leader in the delivery of project, engineering and technical services to energy and industrial markets. To find out more about Wood visit our new website at www.woodplc.com For all the latest updates...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Galp







Amec Foster Wheeler






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Galp in 2026.
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Amec Foster Wheeler in 2026.
Incident History - Galp (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Galp cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Amec Foster Wheeler (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Amec Foster Wheeler cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Galp

Amec Foster Wheeler
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras certificate-related upload interfaces allow authenticated users to store arbitrary file content to fixed, persistent filesystem locations without validating file type, structure, or size. This design omission enables the placement of unexpected or malformed data in locations intended for trusted certificate material, which could affect system integrity or behavior even after reboot.
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras that could allow an authenticated user to supply unsanitized XML fields to the device's certificate generation interface, which are incorporated into a backend certificate creation command without proper input validation. This may allow for command execution with elevated privileges during certificate generation.
The DMP-5000 file service exposes authenticated arbitrary file upload functionality. There are exposed endpoints which allows authenticated users to upload files of any type without validation. No file extension filtering or content inspection is enforced which allows executable binaries and scripts to be accepted and written directly to the server.
The DMP-5000 devices are shipped with a default administrative web account with weak authentication controls, which are not required to be changed during initial configuration or operation. Using these accounts provides full system access.
Various versions of Daktronics Controller Firmware could allow authenticated and unauthenticated remote users to escape the intended directory and enumerate arbitrary file system paths.