Comparison Overview
G Adventures

G Adventures
19 Charlotte Street, Toronto, M5V 2H5, CA
Last Update: 31/03/2026
We’ve always believed that travel isn’t just about where you go — it’s about how it changes you. From the very beginning, we set out to do things differently. No cookie-cutter tours. No giant buses or cruise ships. Just real people, venturing out into the world with op...

BCD Travel
Europalaan 300, Utrecht, NL, 3526 KS
Last Update: 08/09/2026
BCD Travel helps companies travel smart and achieve more. We drive program adoption, cost savings and talent retention through digital experiences that simplify business travel. Our 15,000+ dedicated team members service clients in 170+ countries as we shape a sustainab...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

G Adventures







BCD Travel






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Travel Arrangements Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for G Adventures in 2026.
Incidents vs Travel Arrangements Industry Avg (This Year)
BCD Travel has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - G Adventures (X = Date, Y = Severity)
G Adventures cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - BCD Travel (X = Date, Y = Severity)
BCD Travel cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

G Adventures

BCD Travel
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.