Comparison Overview
Fubon Financial Holding Co., Ltd. 富邦金控

Fubon Financial Holding Co., Ltd. 富邦金控
No.237, Sec. 1, Jianguo S. Rd., Da’an Dist.,, Taipei City, 10657, TW
Last Update: 05/04/2026
以「成為亞洲一流的金融機構」為發展願景的富邦金控,旗下主要子公司包括富邦人壽、台北富邦銀行、富邦銀行(香港)、富邦華一銀行、富邦產險、富邦證券及富邦投信等,擁有最完整多元的金融產品與服務,經營績效耀眼,位居市場領導地位。富邦金控深耕台灣逾60年,以「正向力量 成就可能™」為品牌理念,致力以正向的力量及全方位的金融服務,支持人們追尋美好未來。 截至2025年6月底,富邦金控總資產達11兆9,021億元,為台灣總資產第二大、市值第一大金融控股公司,2025年上半年稅後淨利為513.84億元,每股盈餘(EPS) 3.49元。富邦金控已連續...

La Banque Postale
115, rue de Sèvres, Paris, FR, Cedex 06 75275
Last Update: 08/09/2026
La Banque Postale is a ‘bank like no other’ driven by the post office values of local presence and service. As heir to La Poste Financial Services, it is the only bank to have been tasked with a mission to provide access to banking services under the law introduced to ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Fubon Financial Holding Co., Ltd. 富邦金控







La Banque Postale






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Fubon Financial Holding Co., Ltd. 富邦金控 in 2026.
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for La Banque Postale in 2026.
Incident History - Fubon Financial Holding Co., Ltd. 富邦金控 (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Fubon Financial Holding Co., Ltd. 富邦金控 cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - La Banque Postale (X = Date, Y = Severity)
La Banque Postale cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Fubon Financial Holding Co., Ltd. 富邦金控

La Banque Postale
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
DocsGPT through 0.20.0 posts OAuth connector session tokens to a wildcard target origin in the callback-status endpoint without validating sender origin. Attackers can obtain session tokens and provider account emails by acting as window.opener during OAuth authorization, then use tokens to disconnect victims' cloud storage connectors.
- https://github.com/arc53/DocsGPT
- https://github.com/arc53/DocsGPT/blob/c36b0af17037449f34449efa97da82becfc9492d/docsgpt/api/connector/routes.py#L344-L366
- https://github.com/arc53/DocsGPT/blob/c36b0af17037449f34449efa97da82becfc9492d/docsgpt/api/connector/routes.py#L515-L527
- https://github.com/arc53/DocsGPT/blob/c36b0af17037449f34449efa97da82becfc9492d/frontend/src/components/ConnectorAuth.tsx#L57-L80
- https://github.com/arc53/DocsGPT/issues/2766
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/docsgpt-through-0.20.0-oauth-token-disclosure-via-wildcard-postmessage
DevSpace through 6.3.21 fails to reject parent-directory segments in tar entry names from the in-pod sync stream. Attackers operating a malicious container can stream tar entries with traversal sequences to write arbitrary files on the developer workstation, enabling code execution.
- https://github.com/devspace-sh/devspace
- https://github.com/devspace-sh/devspace/blob/7f272dcf90653fa9b42bc4347f7f3f9a52b0e8b5/pkg/devspace/sync/tar.go#L68-L82
- https://github.com/devspace-sh/devspace/blob/7f272dcf90653fa9b42bc4347f7f3f9a52b0e8b5/pkg/devspace/sync/util.go#L9-L11
- https://github.com/devspace-sh/devspace/issues/3290
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/devspace-through-6.3.21-path-traversal-via-tar-extraction
Refly through 1.1.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the POST /v1/misc/scrape endpoint that fetches caller-supplied URLs without validating the scheme, host, or resolved address. Authenticated attackers can make the backend issue requests to loopback, private, and link-local addresses including cloud metadata services to read page titles and descriptions of internal resources.
- https://github.com/refly-ai/refly
- https://github.com/refly-ai/refly/blob/77fb0ca184251bba7380cbac2dbdf7a6c9944652/apps/api/src/modules/misc/misc.controller.ts#L38-L43
- https://github.com/refly-ai/refly/blob/77fb0ca184251bba7380cbac2dbdf7a6c9944652/packages/utils/src/scrape-weblink.ts
- https://github.com/refly-ai/refly/issues/2280
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/refly-through-1.1.0-server-side-request-forgery-via-scrape-endpoint
GrowthBook through 5.0.1 returns unredacted fact table definitions including raw warehouse SQL in payloads served by unauthenticated public report and experiment endpoints. Attackers with knowledge of a publicly shared report or experiment identifier can read internal data warehouse query text, schema, table names, filter values and datasource identifiers.
- https://github.com/growthbook/growthbook
- https://github.com/growthbook/growthbook/blob/57d07471b137eb43d9bfb1613d0a1203d21fef88/packages/back-end/src/app.ts#L391-L409
- https://github.com/growthbook/growthbook/blob/57d07471b137eb43d9bfb1613d0a1203d21fef88/packages/back-end/src/services/reports.ts#L880-L890
- https://github.com/growthbook/growthbook/issues/6541
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/growthbook-through-5.0.1-information-disclosure-via-public-endpoints
Flowable flowable-engine through 8.0.0 contains an XML external entity injection vulnerability in ProcessDiagramLayoutFactory.parseXml() that fails to disable external entity resolution when parsing deployed BPMN resources. Attackers with process deployment privileges can embed DOCTYPE declarations with external entities in BPMN files to read arbitrary local files or trigger requests to internal network endpoints when diagram layout is computed.
- https://github.com/flowable/flowable-engine
- https://github.com/flowable/flowable-engine/blob/0779d68e5a3385b74d8acb8bc37901ff54513249/modules/flowable-engine/src/main/java/org/flowable/engine/impl/bpmn/diagram/ProcessDiagramLayoutFactory.java#L101-L118
- https://github.com/flowable/flowable-engine/blob/0779d68e5a3385b74d8acb8bc37901ff54513249/modules/flowable5-engine/src/main/java/org/activiti/engine/impl/bpmn/diagram/ProcessDiagramLayoutFactory.java#L97-L114
- https://github.com/flowable/flowable-engine/issues/4216
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/flowable-flowable-engine-through-8.0.0-xxe-via-processdiagramlayoutfactory